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The transition probabilities depend only on the current state of the environment and not on how long it 158 has been in that state. Here we are particularly interested in scenarios where E < 0.25, such that the 159 environment is more likely to stay in the same state than to switch to any other specific state. This 160 positive autocorrelation implies that the current state of the environment is indicative of its likely 161 future state. The lower the value of E, the stronger the positive autocorrelation, so the longer the 162 environment tends to persist in its current state and the more informative the current conditions are 163 about the conditions the forager will experience in the future. 164
165
Under these conditions, we are interested in the reproductive value of the forager given its current 166 energetic state (x) and the current environmental state (d). This is a fitness-related measure developed 167 in behavioural ecology that can be used to compare the outcomes of different decisions in a common 168 currency (McNamara & Houston, 1986) . For the purpose of this model, reproductive value can be 169 simplified to the expected future number of offspring produced by the forager during the remainder of 170 its life (Houston & McNamara, 1999 ), which will depend on x and d. 171
172
If the forager's reserves ever reach 0, it dies, has a reproductive value of 0 and can no longer gain or 173 lose reserves. In addition there is a fixed background probability of mortality per time step, mB, which 174 is independent of energetic reserves. Background mortality is not necessary for the effects we observe 175 but is known to affect optimal risk sensitivity (e.g. McNamara, Merad & Houston, 1991), so we also 176 explore the consequences of changing this parameter. We assume that the forager can only reproduce 177 reproductive value for any current energetic state and current environmental state, UD (x, d) . This 187 represents the forager's expected future number of offspring before it dies. A key feature of our 188 approach is that we do not assume any particular function relating reproductive value to the state 189 variables x and d; rather, this emerges from our calculations and is influenced by the pattern of 190 environmental change. We then use this measure to identify the optimal risk preference, as explained 191
below. 192 193

Risk Preference 194
The expected risk preference of the forager can be determined for any situation (i.e. for any 195
combination of x and d) by offering it a hypothetical gamble: a one-off stochastic option that can be 196 chosen as an alternative to the background deterministic rate of energetic gain (d). The change in 197 reproductive value as a result of accepting this option can be computed and compared to that 198 experienced under the background rate. We assume that the forager is sensitive to differences in 199 reproductive value, i.e. that it has evolved to maximise the expected total quantity of offspring 200 produced in its lifetime. Therefore, if there is a difference between the background and alternative 201 options in terms of reproductive value, we expect the forager to choose the one that yields the higher 202 reproductive value. 203
204
We assume that the gamble offered is related to the current environmental state d. Specifically, the 205 alternative option is a probabilistic gain or loss, R, with probability p = d/R and therefore has the same 206 expected energetic value as the current background deterministic change in reserves
Thus, large gains and losses are assumed to be less likely than small gains and losses, as is known to 208 be the case for gambles faced by humans in a wide variety of real-world contexts (Pleskac & Hertwig, 209 2014). US(x, d, R) represents the expected reproductive value associated with this stochastic option for 210 an individual in state (x, d), i.e. the average result of a change in reserves of size R with probability pand zero change in reserves with probability (1 − p). See equation A6 in Appendix A for an 212 explanation of how we compute this. 213
214
The difference in reproductive value Ψ from choosing the stochastic option over the deterministic 215 option (when both options give an equal expected change in reserves, pR = d) is: 216
(2) 218 219 Equation 2 essentially represents the expected benefit, in terms of reproductive value, from gambling. 220
When Ψ > 0, the forager is expected to be risk seeking, as its change in reproductive value from 221 choosing the risky (stochastic) option is greater than that from choosing the fixed (deterministic) 222 option. Conversely, when Ψ < 0, the reproductive value from choosing the fixed option is greater than 223 that from choosing the risky option and therefore we should expect to see risk-averse behaviour. 224
225
Results
226
The default parameter values for our model are shown in Table 2 conditions and risk aversion under very good (d = +8) and moderately bad (d = −2) conditions. For anequivalent magnitude of potential gains or losses, this corresponds to a tendency to accept gambles for 239 low-probability gains and high-probability losses, but to decline gambles for high-probability gains 240 and low-probability losses. The strength of the risk preferences predicted are strongly dependent on the forager's reserve level 260 (Figure 1b) . Nevertheless, the fourfold pattern holds over a fairly broad range of reserves (see Figure  261 1b) except for reserve levels close to the upper (x = L) or lower (x = 0) boundary, where the 262 opportunity to reproduce or the threat of starvation is imminent and taking the gamble may result in 263 the forager hitting that boundary. Whether it is better to be risk seeking or risk averse is determined by 264 the curvature of the reproductive value functions (shown in Figure B1 reserves whereas risk-averse behaviour is adaptive at high reserves. Our model demonstrates that in a 326 stochastic foraging environment in which conditions are autocorrelated over time, risk preferences 327 may be much more complex. Using a rigorous evolutionary approach based on reproductive value, we 328 have shown that optimal risk preferences can be strongly influenced by the options currently 329 available, because these provide information about the likely future conditions and hence the need to 330 take risks (see Fawcett et al. 2014) . Under this scenario, selection can favour a fourfold pattern of risk 331 preferences. Our evolutionary model predicts a preference for fair gambles over certainty for unlikely 332 gains and likely losses, but an aversion to gambling for likely gains and unlikely losses, as described 333
by Tversky & Kahneman (1992) . It also predicts the stake-dependent fourfold pattern described by 334
Markowitz (1952), namely risk aversion for gambles involving large gains or small losses and risk 335 seeking for gambles involving small gains or large losses. To the best of our knowledge, our model 336 provides the first functional (adaptive) explanation for both of these reported patterns of decision 337 making. 338
339
To understand why the fourfold pattern is adaptive in our model, it is important to consider how 340 environmental conditions now and in the near future affect the probabilities of reaching the 341 reproductive threshold and avoiding the starvation boundary. When environmental conditions are very 342 good (+8 in our default setup), the forager shows risk aversion. Here the forager is in the most 343 favourable situation and is likely to reach the reproductive threshold before conditions change, 344 without having to take risks. Under very bad environmental conditions (−8 in our default setup), in 345 contrast, the forager should be risk seeking. This is the environmental state most likely to deplete the 346 forager's reserves to the starvation boundary; to maximise its chances of surviving until conditions 347 improve, it typically pays the forager to gamble. For the intermediate states, however, the preferences 348 reverse. In the moderately good environmental state (+2 in our default setup), the forager's reservesit is more likely that conditions will worsen (probability 2E) than improve (probability E). The forager 351 therefore needs to take a risk to maximise its chances of reaching the reproductive threshold before 352 conditions change. Conversely, in the moderately bad environmental state (−2 in our default setup), 353 the forager's reserves are decreasing but at a slower rate than in the worst environmental state (−8) , 354
and when a switch occurs it is more likely that conditions will improve (probability 2E) than worsen 355 (probability E). In this situation the forager should avoid taking risks because it can typically afford 356 the smaller deterministic losses (−2) until a switch occurs, before starvation becomes a serious threat. 357
358
Our evolutionary approach to explaining decision making under risk is novel for two reasons. First, in 359 contrast to previous evolutionary approaches, we have determined optimal risk preferences using a 360 rigorous and consistent method based on the concept of reproductive value, which is well established 361 in behavioural ecology (Houston & McNamara, 1999). We made no assumptions about the shape of 362 the value functions -instead, these emerged from the background environment in the model -nor did 363 we assume that subjective estimates of probabilities are biased in any way. This is a powerful feature 364 of our model -a very simple environment that changes stochastically over time can generate complex 365 patterns of risk preferences without the need for specific assumptions about the mechanisms of 366 choice. Second, our work highlights the importance of temporal autocorrelation in the evolution of 367 risk preferences. Most (if not all) environments in the real world, including those in which ancestral 368 humans evolved, show some degree of spatiotemporal heterogeneity and autocorrelation (Halley, 369 1996), so it is reasonable to suggest that these features had some influence on the evolution of our 370 attitudes to risk. By recognising the importance of autocorrelation, evolutionary theory has already 371 provided possible explanations for a number of common cognitive biases that pervade the 372 psychological literature, including contrast effects, optimism and pessimism and violations of 373 regularity (Fawcett et al., 2014) . Here we are suggesting that the fourfold pattern of risk preferences 374 may also represent an adaptive response to temporally autocorrelated environments, in which the 375 options available to the decision maker, and the outcomes of its choices, are indicative of futureAccording to our model, risk taking should depend on the pattern of environmental change to which 379 the decision maker is adapted, and in particular how long it expects current conditions to continue. 380
This does not necessarily imply, however, that the risk preferences measured in experiments on 381 human decision making will be sensitive to information regarding the degree of autocorrelation 382 between choices and the extent to which current options predict options available in the future. 383
Rather, our interpretation is that natural selection has favoured certain attitudes to risk that regulate, in 384 a fairly automatic or subconscious way, the tendency for people to accept gambles as a function of 385 their current situation. Clearly, the type of environment we have modelled differs markedly from the 386 typical set-up in studies of human decision making; our basic argument is that, in such studies, people 387 may be acting on the basis of evolved predispositions that are adapted to natural environments with a 388 richer temporal structure. 389
390
Our model predicts that risk preferences should depend not just on the environmental conditions, but 391 also on the decision maker's current reserve level. In effect, the forager's current reserve level 392 represents a reference point, modulated by current environmental conditions, from which to assess 393 potential gains or losses. This implies that if our explanation is relevant to human decisions involving 394 money, an individual's risk preference should depend on their current level of wealth (and not just on 395 the range of options presented). We therefore make the prediction that people's risk-based choice 396 patterns should covary with their current socio-economic status. These kinds of data are seldom 397 published in decision-making experiments, but, intriguingly, a growing body of evidence suggests that 398 both current wealth and physiological state may affect risk preference. preference for risk (greater reproductive value associated with taking the stochastic option over the 599 deterministic option), whereas points below 0 (Ψ < 0) represent an aversion to risk. See Table 2 Table 2 ). 630 
There is a 1 − mB chance that the forager survives until the next time step. Given this, it gains di unitsFor individuals that reach the lower boundary (x = 0), death occurs and reproductive value is zero: 658
For individuals that exceed the reproduction threshold (x ≥L), the reproductive value is 660
Again there is a 1−mB chance that the forager survives the time step. Given this, it produces Z 662 offspring and its reserves decrease by c, which represents the energetic cost of reproduction. The 663 forager also experiences metabolic noise y and the environmental state changes from di to dj with 664 probability αij. 665
666
We do not assume any fixed time horizon, but the forager will eventually die at some point (either 667 from the background mortality mB or long run of bad conditions) and so total lifetime reproductive 668 success is finite. To calculate this, we iterate backwards through time using equations A2-A4. 669
Initially, when there are relatively few time steps before the end of the modelled period, the forager's 670
reproductive value (as a function of its energy reserves and the environmental state) depends on how 671 much time is left. However, as we continue iterating backwards, the probability of reaching this end 672 point becomes vanishingly small and the reproductive value converges to a stable value UD(x,di) that 673 is independent of time: 674
These calculations result in a look-up table that lays out the reproductive value for every possible 676 combination of x and d. 677
678
US(x,di,R) represents the expected reproductive value associated with the stochastic (risky) option, i.e. 679 a change in reserves R with probability p and a change of 0 with probability 1 − p, where p = di/R. Theforager's initial state is (x,di). As before, the forager experiences metabolic noise y and the 681 environmental state variable changes to dj with the same transition probabilities: 682 The 'fourfold pattern' has been found robustly across large areas of parameter space. Besides the 735 transition probability (Figure 3 , main text), the effect is also shown across background mortalities 736 (mB) ( Figure B6 ) and the size of reserve changes in extreme environments (d1 and d4) ( Figure B7) . 737
The figures below show the change in reproductive value (Ψ) from taking a one-off stochastic option 738 (with a potential gain or loss of R = ±30) instead of the current background deterministic option d 739 under very good (d4), moderately good (d3), moderately bad (d2) and very bad (d1) environmental 740 conditions, for a forager with intermediate reserves (x = 50). All other parameters are held constant at 741 their default values (see Table 2 ). 742 
